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While bank investment is a driving force behind neighborhood viability, few studies have directly examined the effects of bank loan practices on neighbor-
hood crime rates. This paper proposes that variation in residential bank loans helps explain the higher rates of homicide in minority neighborhoods in 
Chicago compared to white neighborhoods. It finds that black and Latino neighborhoods would experience fewer homicides if more financial capital were 
infused into these neighborhoods. These findings suggest that neighborhoods are shaped profoundly by the decisions of external economic actors.
Banks and the Racial Patterning of Homicide:  
A Study of Chicago Neighborhoods
María B. Veléz, Department of Sociology, University of New Mexico, United States
The contemporary economic recession illustrates that the 
actions of the banking industry have serious consequences 
for the world’s communities (Bremmer and Roubini 2009; 
Davis 2009). The financial crisis has also put a spotlight on 
residential loans. In the United States, predatory subprime 
loans, which played a central role in creating the economic 
turmoil, are highly concentrated in minority and low-income 
communities (Woodstock 2008, 2009). Concern has been 
expressed that the global financial crisis will be particularly 
harmful to places that are poor and marginalized and that 
have large shares of people of color. These observations 
suggest the interconnections between banking, race, and eco-
nomic conditions. What do criminologists have to say about 
these connections? At the very least, we would like to know if 
the amount of bank investment influences local crime rates. 
I begin by assessing the impact of levels of mortgage lend-
ing on homicide rates across neighborhoods in one U.S. city 
(Chicago). Given that crime is higher in minority neighbor-
hoods, I pay particular attention to the role of bank mortgage 
allocation in producing racial differentials in violence (Krivo 
and Peterson 1996; Krivo, Peterson and Kuhl 2009; McNulty 
1999; McNulty and Holloway 2000; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Pe-
terson and Krivo 2005, 2009a, 2009b; Sampson and Wilson 
1995; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949; Wilson 1987, 1996).
Bank loans are a promising area of investigation for crimi-
nologists because the actions of banks are a driving force 
shaping neighborhood viability (Garmaise and Moskowitz 
2006; Kim 2000; Massey and Denton 1993; Skogan 1990; 
Smith, Caris, and Wyly 2001; Squires and O’Connor 2001). 
Neighborhoods that receive few bank loans are unable to 
build new housing, repair dilapidated housing, recruit new 
home buyers, sustain existing businesses, or attract new 
businesses. These conditions lead to neighborhood depopu-
lation, decline in local economic opportunities, weakening 
of local social ties, and deterioration of community institu-
tions like schools and churches. All of these developments, 
in turn, would be expected to heighten crime. Gregory 
Squires and Charis Kubrin (2006) evaluate this possibil-
ity with an analysis of Seattle neighborhoods in 2000. 
They find that an increased rate of conventional loans for 
single-family homes directly reduced neighborhood levels 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the 2003 American Society of Criminology meetings 
in Denver, Colorado. I am very grateful to Wayne 
Santoro, Ruth Peterson, Paul Bellair, Christopher 
Browning, Karen Heimer, Jennifer Glanville, 
Mary Noonan, Tony Paik, and Christopher Lyons 
for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This 
research was funded in part by The Ohio State 
University Criminal Justice Research Center and 
the National Consortium on Violence Research 
(NCOVR); NCOVR is supported under Grant 
SBR9513040 from the National Science Foundation.
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of crime. This phenomenon is especially consequential for 
minority, immigrant, and low-income communities in the 
United States and elsewhere, which share limited access to 
financial capital and histories of community disinvestment 
(Aalbers 2005; Bolt, van Kempen and van Ham 2008; Fuller 
and Mellor 2008; Immergluck 2002; Massey and Denton 
1993; Peterson and Krivo 2009b; Squires and O’Conner 
2001). There is considerable evidence that minority neigh-
borhoods in the United States receive fewer loans and fewer 
loan dollars than white neighborhoods even after adjusting 
for neighborhood economic conditions (Dedman 1988; Far-
ley, Danziger, and Holzer 2000; Holloway and Wyly 2001; 
Metropolitan Chicago Information Center 2007; Squires 
and O’Connor 2001). Research from the United Kingdom 
also indicates that older low-income neighborhoods with 
devalued housing stock experienced redlining, in which 
funds for housing and home buying are diverted or not al-
located (Pacione 2005).
By focusing on the role of lending in shaping differences in 
lethal violence across minority and white neighborhoods, I 
hope to contribute to the literature on the link between race 
and crime that has taken center stage recently in the field of 
criminology (Krivo and Peterson 2005; Krivo, Peterson, and 
Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b). To explain 
the racial disparity in crime rates, most researchers focus 
on the disadvantaged status and accompanying crime-
producing conditions of African American neighborhoods. 
Compared to white neighborhoods, for instance, black 
neighborhoods are more likely to have high poverty rates, 
public housing projects, underfunded schools, weak local 
institutions, and to be spatially proximate to other poor 
neighborhoods (Krivo and Peterson 1996; McNulty and 
Holloway 2000; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Sampson and Wilson 
1995; Wilson 1987, 1996). Yet such an approach typically 
finds that the minority-white gap in neighborhood crime, 
especially violent crime, cannot be explained completely 
even after a variety of conditions are taken into account 
(Fitzgerald and Carrington 2008; Krivo and Peterson 1996; 
McNulty and Holloway 2000; Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 
2009b). Thus, I am proposing that because bank loans are a 
site of racial inequality, their inclusion in crime models will 
move us toward a more complete explanation of the link 
between race and crime.
Highlighting the relevance of bank lending practices to 
criminological processes helps to broaden our conceptu-
alization of macro-level processes. Most community and 
crime research has focused on intra-neighborhood dynam-
ics such as ties among neighbors or collective efficacy to un-
derstand how communities control crime (e.g., Bellair 1997; 
Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Warner and Roun-
tree 1997). This leads to viewing high crime rates largely as a 
result of the inability of residents within a neighborhood to 
organize collectively against crime. But a growing number 
of criminologists draw upon insights from urban political 
economy to argue that the actions of political and economic 
elites historically and currently have created conditions that 
cause minority neighborhoods to have more crime than 
white neighborhoods (Bruce, Roscigno and McCall 1998; 
Bursik 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Feagin 2001; Hirsch 
1983; Logan and Molotch 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; 
McNulty and Holloway 2000; Mears and Bhati 2006; More-
noff et al. 2001; Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; Smith et 
al. 2001). For instance, city elites almost always place public 
housing in poor and minority neighborhoods, which do 
not have sufficient leverage to organize effectively against 
such initiatives. As a result, these already poor communities 
experience an increased concentration of poverty, residen-
tial instability, and violence (Bruce et al. 1998; Bursik 1989; 
Massey and Denton 1993; McNulty and Holloway 2000). 
By focusing on bank loans—resources allocated by outside 
economic actors—this study seeks to further our under-
standing of how macro-criminological processes result in 
part from decision making that is external to the neighbor-
hood affected by crime. Such a perspective reminds us that 
neighborhoods are not islands unto themselves, but are 
embedded within a larger political and economic context.
1. Neighborhood Research on the Link between Race and Crime
Contemporary research on race and crime largely draws on 
the American experience. Community and crime research-
ers argue that differences in crime rates between minor-
ity and white neighborhoods can be explained largely by 
the stark differences in their relative levels of structural 
disadvantage (Almgren, Guest, Immerwahr and Spittel 
1998; Fitzgerald and Carrington 2008; Krivo and Peterson 
1996; 2009; McNulty 1999; McNulty and Holloway 2000; 
Peterson and Krivo 2005, 2009; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949; 
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Sampson and Wilson 1995; Shihadeh and Shrum 2004; 
Wilson 1987, 1996; Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite 2003). 
Most researchers focus on the social isolation generated 
by contexts of concentrated disadvantage, which in turn is 
associated with several major community characteristics 
that make crime more prevalent. Disadvantaged contexts, 
for instance, lead to indicators of diminished community 
social organization like weak ties between neighbors and 
low levels of collective efficacy (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 
1997). Moreover, in disadvantaged contexts, cultural adapta-
tions like ghetto-related behavior or the code of the street 
make violence more likely (Anderson 1999; Wilson 1996). 
The current thinking is that neighborhood disadvantage 
inhibits community social control and produces cultural 
adaptations, which together increase crime. Because minor-
ity neighborhoods are more disadvantaged, this process 
should be particularly salient for explaining their relatively 
high incidence of crime.
Lauren Krivo and Ruth Peterson (1996), for example, assessed 
the impact of disadvantage on property crime rates for white 
and black neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio. They found 
that there were no significant differences in property crime 
rates in black versus white neighborhoods once levels of dis-
advantage were taken into account. Similarly, Robin Fitzger-
ald and Peter Carrington (2008), in a study of neighborhoods 
in Winnipeg, Canada, found a strong positive relationship 
between the proportion of Aboriginal residents and crime 
levels. They also found that socioeconomic disadvantage and 
residential mobility account for a large measure of the link 
between race and crimein Winnipeg neighborhoods.
While in some cases the link between race and crime can 
be accounted for by disadvantaged status and its accompa-
nying crime-producing conditions, this is not always true 
for violent crimes. Krivo and Peterson (1996) found that in 
both low- and high-disadvantaged areas, predicted violent 
crime rates were higher in African American than white 
neighborhoods. Similarly, Thomas McNulty and Steven 
Holloway (2000) were unable to explain away the race 
effect for robbery rates in Atlanta even after adjusting for 
neighborhood disadvantage and proximity to public hous-
ing. To make sense of this finding, most community and 
crime scholars have interpreted the residual race effect as 
reflecting unmeasured structural factors, such as under-
funded schools, spatial proximity to disadvantaged areas, or 
cultural adaptations like the code of the street (Alba, Logan 
and Bellair 1994; Krivo and Peterson 1996; McNulty and 
Holloway 2000; Pattillo 1998; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Peterson 
and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949).
2. The Role of Bank Loans
An important factor missing from research on neighbor-
hood crime rates is the external resources allocated by 
economic officials to neighborhoods. Among the key 
external resources are residential bank loans. Residential 
loans include monies for multifamily building purchases, 
home improvement, refinancing, and conventional and 
government-subsidized purchases of single-family dwell-
ings. An infusion of residential bank loans should inhibit 
or at least curtail a spiral of neighborhood decline. In 
particular, neighborhoods that receive few loans embark 
on a trajectory of physical decline and abandonment which 
some research suggests culminates in heightened levels of 
crime and victimization (Massey and Denton 1993; Skogan 
1990; Squires and Kubrin 2006). Without loans there are not 
enough resources to refurbish housing and building stock, 
leading to their deterioration. The neighborhood becomes 
characterized by abandoned houses, broken windows, litter, 
graffiti, and other indicators of physical decline. This physi-
cal disorder is associated with crime directly and indirectly 
(see Kelling and Coles 1996; Markowitz et al. 2001; Sampson 
and Raudenbush 1999; Skogan 1990; Taylor 2001; Wilson 
and Kelling 1982).
In addition, an infusion of bank loans should facilitate a 
community’s ability to control crime, through a process 
referred to as public social control (Bursik and Grasmick 
1993; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Veléz 2001). Researchers 
who study public social control have found that neighbor-
hoods with strong ties to the police and local public officials 
benefit from more informal social control (Silver and Miller 
2004) and less household and personal victimization. This 
is the case especially in disadvantaged neighborhoods 
(Veléz 2001). External ties are thought to help neighbor-
hoods secure external resources, which may lead to more 
bank loans, better police protection, city-sponsored green-
ing projects, and the like.
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Unfortunately, many of these studies are unable to measure 
the external resource in question. By contrast, this study 
assembles bank lending data for each neighborhood to test 
these hypotheses. An infusion of loan monies should reduce 
crime because it sets in motion processes that stimulate the 
community control needed to reduce crime. For instance, 
loans provide incentives for residents to move into and stay 
in the neighborhood, because they allow the purchase, re-
pair, and refinancing of homes. Loan monies should facili-
tate residential stability by encouraging residents to invest 
further in their neighborhood (Squires and Kubrin 2006). 
Residential stability also stimulates community participa-
tion in neighborhood activities like neighborhood watch 
associations, and this participation in turn allows such or-
ganizations to lobby more effectively for additional external 
resources (Campen 1992; Dawley 1992; Medoff and Sklar 
1994; Metzger 1992; Rabrenovic 1996; Rooney 1995). For 
instance, Duncan Fuller and Mary Mellor (2008) document 
a community organization whose primary purpose was to 
increase financial empowerment for a low-income commu-
nity which had experienced major financial disinvestment. 
Strategies included providing debt counseling, delivering 
business advice, and offering basic banking accounts.
An infusion of residential bank loans should also improve 
the economic situation of a neighborhood, thereby reduc-
ing crime. As William Julius Wilson (1996) points out, a 
major reason for high crime and other deleterious outcomes 
in inner city neighborhoods is their high male joblessness 
(see also Krivo and Peterson 1996). External resources can 
expand local economic opportunities in a variety of ways. 
Residential bank loans, because they help neighborhoods im-
prove their physical appearance, provide incentives for busi-
nesses to move to or stay in disadvantaged neighborhoods. 
Bank loans also help a neighborhood maintain its popula-
tion base by encouraging people to purchase or fix up their 
homes, which creates and helps sustain a business’s customer 
base. By expanding employment opportunities, an infusion 
of loans should offer a lucrative alternative to criminal activ-
ity as well as create an environment that encourages existing 
businesses to stay and new businesses to start. In sum, an 
investment by banks in a neighborhood should reduce lethal 
violence by reducing physical disorder, increasing public 
social control, and expanding employment opportunities.
3. Determinants of Mortgage Lending
In order to more fully explicate the role of bank lending in 
understanding the association between race and crime, it is 
important to examine how lending varies across neighbor-
hoods. The large body of work that examines mortgage lend-
ing in urban contexts highlights the role of two key deter-
minants for its uneven distribution. One factor consistently 
associated with variation in bank lending is neighborhood 
racial composition, which is often measured as the percent-
age of African American or Latino inhabitants in a given 
census tract. Race matters at both the macro and micro level. 
Research indicates that banks allocate more loans and more 
loan dollars to white neighborhoods than to minority neigh-
borhoods, even after controlling for important economic 
factors. Gregory Squires and Sally O’Connor (2001), for ex-
ample, find that majority-minority neighborhoods received 
a very small percentage of loans and loan dollars relative to 
areas that were predominantly white. Another study shows 
that banks in Detroit were about three times more likely to 
make mortgage loans in white census tracts compared to 
economically comparable black tracts (Farley, Danziger, and 
Holzer 2000). Elvin Wyly and Steven Holloway’s analysis of 
moderate income census tracts in Atlanta during the early 
1990s (1999) finds that conventional home purchase loans 
are made significantly more frequently in white than in 
black neighborhoods (see also Dedman 1988; Holloway and 
Wyly 2001). At the micro level, Alicia Munnell et al. (1996) 
analyzed data collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton to find that blacks were more likely to have a mortgage 
loan application denied, even with important controls for 
default risk and loan characteristics (see also Holloway 1998; 
Squires and O’Connor 2001). Other work finds that minor-
ity applicants have a harder time getting a mortgage loan if 
the property is located in a white neighborhood, suggesting 
that white neighborhoods are harder for minorities to access 
for housing (Ezeala-Harrison et al. 2008; Holloway 1998). 
Minorities who apply for loans in majority-black neighbor-
hoods do not experience such lending disadvantages.
The second factor associated with variation in lending is so-
cioeconomic status, which is often measured by the percent-
age of inhabitants below the poverty line or the median hous-
ing values in a given census tract. Mortgage lending tends to 
be more frequent in well-established middle- to upper-class 
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neighborhoods. For instance, in a study of Milwaukee census 
tracts, Squires and O’Connor (2001) examine the differences 
in mortgage lending activity between poor, devalued neigh-
borhoods (what they term target areas) and other neighbor-
hoods. They find persistent gaps in conventional mortgage 
lending, with fewer loans and dollars allocated to target areas 
compared to other parts of the city. They also find that target 
census tracts had significantly higher loan denial rates than 
non-target areas.
It is important to note that these studies conceptualize 
mortgage lending as a resource that benefits communities. 
As discussed earlier, infusions of home loans contribute 
to neighborhood viability. Yet the current financial cri-
sis in the United States highlights the problems created 
by a different type of mortgage lending—predatory and 
subprime—especially for poor and minority communi-
ties. These mortgage practices prey on poor and minority 
communities, making their members pay more for lending 
capital than their affluent and white counterparts (Allison 
and Mayo 2005; Woodstock 2009). Their higher risks are 
associated with higher foreclosure rates, which contribute 
to neighborhood decline through property vacancies, loss 
of equity, depopulation, lower housing values, and crime. 
For instance, Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith (2006) 
found that foreclosures translated into increases in violent 
crime in neighborhoods in Chicago. Predatory and sub-
prime loans are disproportionately clustered in poor and 
minority communities, which are particularly vulnerable to 
neighborhood decline. Because housing loans are expected 
to bolster neighborhood viability, especially for minority 
communities, it is particularly important to understand the 
impact of lending on these neighborhoods.
4. Data and Methods
The early to mid-1990s marked a peak of violent crime 
and subsequent public concern in Chicago, along with the 
rest of the United States. Chicago has been the subject of 
long-standing theoretical interest in criminological and 
urban sociological processes (Sampson et al. 1997; Shaw and 
McKay 1942; Wilson 1987, 1996). It is also diverse across race 
and class lines, making it an appropriate site for studying 
the relation of race and crime. Furthermore, Chicago is an 
ideal setting for examining the distribution of residential 
bank loans because some of its neighborhoods and orga-
nizations have been at the forefront of challenging biased 
bank lending practices.1 I utilize data from archival and 
secondary data sources, which I will outline while discuss-
ing the measurement of variables.
Community and crime researchers use a variety of geo-
graphical markers to denote neighborhoods, such as police 
beats, neighborhood clusters, and census tracts. I have used 
census tracts, which cover smaller geographical areas than 
police beats or neighborhood clusters. The average popula-
tion of a census tract in Chicago is 3,466 residents. There are 
a total of 865 census tracts in Chicago, but the sample here 
is limited to census tracts with at least 100 residents, a total 
of 786 census tracts.
4.1. Variables and Measures
4.1.1. Dependent Variable
Homicide. Homicides, an important indicator of neigh-
borhood violence, are the most accurately reported crime 
(Morenoff et al. 2001). I conceptualize homicide as a count 
rather than a rate variable, because most neighborhoods 
in Chicago have few if any homicides. In this sample, 220 
neighborhoods (28 percent) had zero homicides during 
1993–1995. Moreover, when the population size of an aggre-
gate unit is small relative to the offense rate, the homicide 
rate must be computed from a small number of crimes, mak-
ing it inappropriate for least squares analysis (Kubrin and 
Weitzer 2003; Osgood 2000). To ease interpretation, I follow 
D. Wayne Osgood (2000) and include the natural logarithm 
of the size of the population at risk and fix it to one. This 
makes the negative binomial regression an analysis of rates 
1 For instance, in the 1970s the Citizens Action 
Program made community reinvestment a major 
theme (Squires et al. 1987). Their actions were critical 
in getting Congress to pass the Community Reinvest-
ment Act of 1977 and the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act. This group (now known as the National Training 
and Information Center) continues to pressure bank 
officials to ensure equitable lending. Recently, the Na-
tional Training and Information Center coordinated 
the Illinois Coalition Against Predatory Home Loans, 
which led to the passage of anti–predatory lending 
legislation in 2003 and the City of Chicago Anti–
Predatory Lending Law (the first such municipal law 
in the country). Predatory practices include engaging 
in deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower 
through aggressive sales tactics, or taking unfair ad-
vantage of a borrower’s lack of understanding about 
loan terms (Housing and Urban Development 2007).
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of events per capita, rather than a counts model. Homicide 
per capita rates represent the number of homicide incidents 
per capita in a three-year period (1993–95). The homicide 
data are based on police reports of homicide incidents, which 
were geo-coded based on the address of the incident. These 
homicide incidents were then aggregated to the census tract 
to capture the total number of homicides occurring in each 
census tract during the three-year period. The data were 
downloaded from the Chicago Homicide Data Set at the 
ICPSR data archive and were collected originally by Carolyn 
and Richard Block (1998). The homicide per capita rates for 
each census tract include cases of non-negligent manslaugh-
ter but exclude deaths from injuries inflicted by police or 
other law-enforcement agents (see Morenoff et al. 2001).
4.1.2. Independent Variables
Residential loans. I operationalized residential bank loans in 
two ways. First, I examine the total dollar amount of residen-
tial loans allocated to each census tract in 1992 (in millions). 
Second, I capture the total number of loans allocated to a 
census tract for single to multi-family, home-improvement, 
refinancing, and conventional purchases, as well as loans 
made through the Veterans Administration and Federal 
Housing Administration. Because the measure includes a 
wide array of home mortgages, it functions as a global indi-
cator of how much lending is taking place in a community. 
These data are taken from the 1992 issue of the Community 
Lending Fact Book, published by the Woodstock Institute, a 
nonprofit agency that tracks the lending practices of Chicago 
banking institutions using home mortgage disclosure data. 
The data are made available by the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act, which requires most American financial institu-
tions to maintain and annually disclose data about home 
purchases, home purchase pre-approvals, home improve-
ment, and refinance applications involving 1- to 4-unit and 
multifamily dwellings. Note that the above bank lending 
variables are treated as both dependent and independent 
variables. I conceptualize them primarily as independent 
variables because the theoretical premise in this paper is that 
their uneven distribution across neighborhoods is conse-
quential for variation in homicide.
To take into account that the effect of home loan investment 
on homicide may be spatially embedded, I compute spatial 
lags for the two lending variables. More formally, the spatial 
lag is:
where wij is an element of row-standardized spatial weights 
matrix, and sj is the total loan rate in each census tract’s 
neighbors as identified by the spatial weights matrix (An-
selin 2003). Subscript i refers to a particular census tract; 
subscript j refers to the census tract’s neighbors. The spatial 
weights matrix defines the range of interaction across space. 
The range of interaction is based on the first-order rook 
contiguity spatial weight matrix which defines the observa-
tions that share common boundaries as neighbors, which 
should capture the likely “reach” of bank resources repre-
sented by the measures of lending activity.
Racial composition. The central independent variable of 
interest is racial composition. Using 1990 Census data (STF 
3A), I created three dummy variables for majority Latino, 
majority African American, and racially heterogeneous 
neighborhoods. Majority African American neighborhoods 
are census tracts that are at least 50 percent African Ameri-
can (coded one; zero otherwise). This makes up 40 percent of 
the sample. I consider neighborhoods to be majority Latino if 
they are at least 50 percent Latino (coded one; zero other-
wise). Fourteen percent of sampled neighborhoods are ma-
jority Latino. Heterogeneous neighborhoods are census tracts 
in which “other” racial groups (for example, Asian Ameri-
cans) make up the majority; or Latinos, whites, or African 
Americans make up less than 50 percent of the population 
(coded one; zero otherwise). Such neighborhoods make up 7 
percent of sampled neighborhoods. The reference category, 
majority white neighborhoods, which make up 39 percent of 
the surveyed neighborhoods, are places in which more than 
50 percent of residents are white (coded one, zero otherwise).
Neighborhood-level controls. I control for six neighborhood 
characteristics. Drawing on previous research (e.g., Krivo 
and Peterson 1996), I constructed a concentrated disadvan-
tage index by standardizing (converting to z-scores) and 
summing the following indicators for each census tract: (1) 
the percentage of households with incomes below the poverty 
line; (2) the percentage of persons age 16 and older employed 
in professional and managerial occupations (reverse-coded); 
∑ w s ,ijj j
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(3) the percentage of households that are female-headed; and 
(4) the percentage of civilian non-institutionalized males age 
16 and older who are either unemployed or not in the labor 
force. Data for these indicators are from the 1990 U.S. Census 
of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3A.
As another measure of socioeconomic status, I adjust for 
median housing values in a given census tract. Data for this 
indicator are from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing, Summary Tape File 3A.
The residential stability index standardizes and sums 
values for two factors: (1) the percentage of a census tract’s 
population five years of age or older who stayed in the same 
residence between 1985 and 1990; and (2) the percentage of 
dwelling units that are owner occupied (alpha = .68). Data 
come from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population and Hous-
ing, Summary Tape File 3A. Housing units is the number of 
housing units in a census tract (1990 U.S. Census, STF 3A).
The final two controls measure additional aspects of homi-
cide by neighborhood. First, prior homicide rates are mea-
sured with the three-year average homicide rate (1988–90) 
per 1,000 population in a neighborhood. I control for prior 
homicide as a way to absorb some of the processes that led 
to past variation in homicide among neighborhoods. Do-
ing so allows me to better determine the effects of lending 
and other variables on current homicide levels. Homicide 
data were obtained from the Chicago Homicide Data Set as 
discussed above. To take into account that homicide may 
be spatially embedded, the second measure is a spatial lag 
of the homicide per capita rate that captures the homicide 
count of surrounding communities for a focal community. 
I utilize the same weighting strategy as discussed above for 
the two lending measures so as to capture the likely “reach” 
of violence in focal and proximate communities.
4.2. Analytic Strategy
I first assess the impact of racial composition on neighbor-
hood distributions of bank loans to determine the extent 
of racial inequality. Disadvantaged and minority neighbor-
hoods are expected to experience gaps in home mortgage 
lending compared to their more affluent and white counter-
parts. I then examine the effect of racial composition and 
all independent variables except residential bank loans on 
neighborhood homicide levels. This analysis demonstrates 
the extent to which black and Latino neighborhoods experi-
ence higher levels of violence than white neighborhoods 
before bank loan distribution is taken into account. Last, I 
estimate the role of bank loans in reducing neighborhood 
homicide per capita rates and to what extent they help ex-
plain the racial disparity in crime.
I examine loan (number) and homicide per capita rates 
using negative binomial regression, the appropriate tech-
nique to employ in the presence of over-dispersion (Kubrin 
and Weitzer 2003; Long 1997, Morenoff et al. 2001; Osgood 
2000). In presenting the regression findings I also consid-
ered the potential effects of multicollinearity. The vari-
ance inflation factors do not exceed four in any equation, 
indicating multicollinearity does not exceed typical levels of 
concern (Belsey, Kuh and Welsch 1980).
5. Findings and Discussion
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides mean and standard deviation for all vari-
ables across all neighborhoods as well as majority white, 
black, and Latino neighborhoods in Chicago. It is clear 
that there are important differences in the substantive and 
control variables across neighborhood racial composition. 
African American and Latino neighborhoods average more 
than six and three homicides, respectively, while white 
neighborhoods have on average less than one. The spatial lag 
of homicide shows that minority neighborhoods are much 
more likely than white neighborhoods to be surrounded by 
neighborhoods with high levels of homicide. Also important 
is bank loan distribution. White neighborhoods received 
on average more than $12 million in loans compared to 
about $1.5 million in African American neighborhoods and 
about $3 million for Latino communities. Similar disparities 
prevail in the number of residential bank loans allotted to 
communities. African American and Latino neighborhoods 
received, on average, 25 and 39 loans, respectively, while 
white neighborhoods received 114 loans. A further indica-
tion of racial gaps in lending is that minority as compared to 
white neighborhoods are much more likely to be embedded 
in seas of little lending activity (spatial lags for loan vari-
ables). These racial differences are both substantively large 
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and statistically significant, revealing that minority neigh-
borhoods are at a tremendous investment disadvantage in 
at least one large city in the United States. No doubt some of 
this racial disparity in lending is due to the class disadvan-
tage of minority neighborhoods. To separate out class from 
race statistically, I turn next to the multivariate findings.
Table 1: Neighborhood means and standard deviations (in parentheses)
All (N=786) White (N=306) Black (N=313) Latino (N=110)
Homicide count  3.537  (4.904)
 .908 
 (1.800)
 6.125* 
 (5.556)
 3.200* 
 (3.076)
Spatial lag of homicide  3.380  (3.213)
 1.375 
 (2.023)
 5.582* 
 (3.312)
 3.042* 
 (2.031)
Residential loans ($1,000,000)  6.241  (9.252)
 12.294 
 (11.972)
 1.484* 
 (2.511)
 2.921* 
 (2.491)
Spatial lag of loan dollars  5.721  (7.563)
 11.460 
 (9.736)
 1.646* 
 (1.882)
 2.681* 
 (1.712)
Residential loan numbers  63.987  (73.505)
 114.578 
 (89.773)
 24.760* 
 (29.036)
 39.009* 
 (28.556)
Spatial lag of loan numbers  58.720  (59.062)
 106.008 
 (67.918)
 26.363* 
 (24.437)
 34.588* 
 (17.913)
Majority African American  .398  (.490) — — —
Majority Latino   .140  (.347) — — —
Heterogeneous  .073  (.260) — — —
Majority white  .389  (.488) — — —
Concentrated disadvantage index  .000  (3.304)
 -2.630 
 (1.476)
 2.623* 
 (3.142)
 .329* 
 (1.894)
— Extreme poverty (%)  .181  (.385)
 .000 
 (.000)
 .383* 
 (.487)
 .164* 
 (.372)
— Male joblessness (%)  40.289  (17.337)
 28.327 
 (8.229)
 55.750* 
 (15.237)
 32.944* 
 (8.639)
— Female-headed families (%)  13.190  (12.852)
 3.791 
 (2.994)
 22.909* 
 (14.077)
 13.644* 
 (7.600)
— Professionals (%)  12.783  (10.939)
 19.854 
 (12.704)
 8.134* 
 (6.646)
 6.198* 
 (3.939)
Median housing values  91.327  (83.603)
 136.521 
 (104.226)
 57.278* 
 (48.244)
 56.861* 
 (25.190)
Residential stability index  .000  (1.740)
 .287 
 (1.982)
 .205* 
 (1.625)
 -.537* 
 (.814)
— Owner occupied housing (%)  40.182  (24.532)
 51.385 
 (24.348)
 34.604* 
 (24.928)
 32.520* 
 (13.011)
— Same residence in last five years (%)  55.264  (14.642)
 52.776 
 (16.303)
 61.587* 
 (12.291)
 51.973 
 (7.816)
Prior homicide rate  .370  (.545)
 .113 
 (.401)
 .650* 
 (.603)
 .348* 
 (.424)
Housing units  1414.770  (1101.812)
 1701.990 
 (1276.59)
 1169.220* 
 (866.127)
 1100.320* 
 (673.993)
* Significant difference in means of black or Latino neighborhoods from white neighborhoods.
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5.2. Multivariate Findings
Table 2 predicts the distribution of residential loans across 
Chicago neighborhoods during the early to mid-1990s. 
This analysis assesses the extent of racial inequality in bank 
lending practices after economic conditions are taken into ac-
count as well as other potential predictors. Table 2 shows sub-
stantial racial disparities in residential bank loans. Compared 
to white neighborhoods, black neighborhoods are awarded on 
average $2.4 million less than white neighborhoods. There is 
no significant difference in dollars allocated between Latino 
and white communities.2 When examining the number of 
loans, black and Latino communities receive fewer loans 
than their white counterparts. Note the stark disparities in 
the distribution of bank loans despite rigorous controls for 
concentrated disadvantage, median housing values, prior 
homicide rates, and the spatial diffusion of lending. This pat-
tern is consistent with historical and contemporary accounts 
of the lending practices of banks in black and Latino neigh-
borhoods (Ezeala-Harrison, Glover and Shaw Jackson 2008; 
Massey and Denton 1993; Squires et al. 1987; Squires 1994). 
In addition, this finding parallels research that has shown 
that minority individuals are disadvantaged in interactions 
with banks. Minorities, for instance, are less likely to receive 
bank loans and more likely to pay higher mortgage rates than 
whites after adjusting for socioeconomic factors like credit 
records and neighborhood status (Allison and Mayo 2005; 
Holloway and Wyly 2001; Munnell et al. 1992; Squires and 
O’Connor 2001). While this study cannot demonstrate that 
racism accounts for these lending gaps, the vast literature on 
this subject shows the meaningful role of racism in the under-
allotment of funds to minority neighborhoods. More general-
ly, my argument is consistent with discussions of institutional 
or systemic discrimination—that is, racial inequality that 
results from the normal operation of societal institutions—in 
many other sociological domains such as physical and mental 
health (Nazroo 2003; Williams 1999), housing (Massey and 
Denton 1993), and everyday activities such as shopping and 
going to work (Feagin 2001). The next set of analyses will 
assess the extent to which this racialized context of lending is 
consequential for the racial patterning of homicide.
Table 2:  OLS and negative binomial regressions with  robust standard errors 
of residential loans on  racial composition and controls (N=786) 
Residential loans ($) Residential loans (#)
b
(se)
b
(se)
Racial composition
Majority African American -2.408***(.481)
-.493***
(.091)
Majority Latino -.727(.444)
-.262**
(.076)
Heterogeneous -1.803***(.549)
-.243*
(.107)
Controls
Concentrated disadvantage .069(.093)
-.147***
(.022)
Median housing values -.029**(.007)
-.001
(.001)
Residential stability .463**(.162)
.036
(.051)
Prior homicide .439(.279)
-.047
(.103)
Housing units .002***(.000)
-.000**
(.000)
Spatial lag .001***(.000)
.003***
(.001)
Constant -2.080*** -4.014**
R2 .739 …
Chi square … 1438.20***
Note:  * p < .05, two tailed; ** p < .01, two tailed; *** p < .001, two tailed
Table 3 provides findings for homicide per capita rates. As 
expected, Model 1 shows that minority neighborhoods have 
higher rates of lethal violence compared to white neigh-
borhoods, controlled for concentrated disadvantage and 
other factors. Specifically, African American and Latino 
neighborhoods are almost five and two times more likely, 
respectively, to experience a homicide than white neighbor-
hoods, holding all other variables constant.3 Put differently, 
the statistically significant coefficient of 1.607 indicates 
that African American neighborhoods have a 399 percent 
higher per capita rate of homicide than white neighbor-
2 It is important to note that Latino communities are 
allocated significantly fewer loan dollars than white 
neighborhoods before median housing values are 
entered into the models. The effect becomes non-
significant when median housing values are adjusted.
3 Factor changes in the expected per capita rate for nega-
tive binomial regressions are computed by taking the 
absolute value of the exponential of the unstandardized 
coefficient, i.e., exp(1.607); see Long 1997; Osgood 2002.
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hoods.4 Similarly, the statistically significant coefficient of 
.832 indicates that the average Latino neighborhood has 
a homicide per capita rate 130 percent higher than that of 
white neighborhoods.
4 Following Long (1997, 228), percent changes 
in the expected count for negative binomial 
regressions are computed by taking the absolute 
value of the exponential of the unstandardized 
coefficient, subtracting this from 1, and multiply-
ing the result by 100—i.e., [1-exp(1.607)]*100.
Table 3: Negative binomial regression models of homicide per capita rates with robust standard errors (N= 786)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b eb
(% change)
b eb
(% change)
b eb
(% change)
Residential loans ($) ... ... -.020*(.008)
.97
(3%) ... ...
Residential loans (#) ... ... ... ... -.004***(.002)
.996
(.40%)
Racial composition
Majority African American 1.607***(.159)
4.99
(399%)
1.498***
(.139)
4.15
(315%)
1.367***
(.144)
3.94
(294%)
Majority Latino .833***(.138)
2.30
(130%)
.741***
(.132)
2.16
(116%)
.684***
(.131)
1.97
(97%)
Heterogenous .995**(.295)
2.71
(170%)
.911***
(.145)
2.49
(149%)
.858***
(.144)
2.36
(136%)
Controls
Concentrated disadvantage -.010(.025)
.99
(-1%)
-.014
(.018)
1.02
(2%)
-.013
(.017)
.99
(1.29%)
Median housing values -.003**
(.001)
1.00
(-.30%)
-.002**
(.001)
1.00
(-.20%)
-.002**
(.001)
1.00
(-.20%)
Residential stability -.122**(.040)
.89
(-11%)
-.120***
(.025)
.91
(-9%)
-.075***
(.028)
.93
(-7%)
Prior homicide .371***(.107)
1.45
(45%)
.384***
(.082)
1.43
(43%)
.380***
(.081)
1.46
(46%)
Number of housing units -.000*(.000)
1.00
(0%)
-.000
(.000)
1
(0%)
.000
(.000)
1
(0%)
Spatial lag .018+(.011)
1.02
(2%)
.015
(.012)
1.02
(2%)
.015
(.012)
1.02
(2%)
Constant -7.767*** ... -7.695*** ... -7.595*** ...
Chi square 597.20*** ... 550.20*** ... 559.45*** ...
Alpha (over-dispersion parameter) .405(.083) ...
.397
(.042) ...
.387
(.041) ...
Note:  + p < .10, two tailed; * p < .05, two tailed; ** p < .01, two tailed; *** p < .001, two tailed
165IJCV : Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 154 – 171María B. Veléz: Banks and the Racial Patterning of Homicide
Models 2 and 3 introduce residential bank loans to assess 
the extent that loans reduce homicide per capita rates. Find-
ings indicate that an infusion of bank capital in a neighbor-
hood reduces lethal violence. For example, Model 2 shows 
that for every additional million dollars in bank loans, a 
neighborhood’s homicide per capita rate decreases by three 
percent or by a factor of .97, while holding all other variables 
in the model constant. In human terms, this means that a 
typical Chicago neighborhood would experience one fewer 
homicide every three years. Moreover, Model 3 shows that 
each loan decreases a neighborhood’s homicide per capita 
rate by almost half a percent or a factor of about one, while 
holding constant all other variables in the model. To explain 
these findings, I suggest that infusions of bank capital give 
tools to neighborhoods to control crime: either informally 
through neighbor interactions, by providing resources to 
fix up housing and other buildings, or by expanding local 
economic opportunities.
Bank lending also partially ameliorates some of the homi-
cide rates in minority neighborhoods. When residential 
bank loans are taken into account, the amount of violence 
in African American neighborhoods is lessened. Specifi-
cally, Model 2 indicates that black neighborhoods have 4 
times the homicide per capita rate of white neighborhoods 
compared to almost 5 times in Model 1. The disparity is 
diminished somewhat for majority Latino neighborhoods 
as well. A similar pattern emerges for both black and Latino 
neighborhoods when the number of loans is considered 
rather than the dollar amount. It follows then that if Afri-
can American and Latino neighborhoods did not experi-
ence the lending disadvantage illustrated in Table 2, there 
would be substantial reductions in lethal violence.
I turn now to a brief discussion of the control variables. 
Neighborhoods with higher median housing values have 
lower homicide rates. It appears that socioeconomic advan-
tage can help protect against lethal violence. For example, re-
search regarding affluent communities points to their use of 
political power to create and implement zoning restrictions 
that limit the encroachment of crime-producing settings 
like bars, taverns, and public housing projects (McNulty and 
Holloway 2000; Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; Veléz et 
al. 2003).5 Models also show that homicide is lower in resi-
dentially stable neighborhoods, a finding in line with social 
disorganization research, which contends that residential 
stability stimulates the formation of conventional social 
networks and subsequent informal social controls such as 
neighbors watching out for each other’s property (Bellair 
1997). Neighborhoods with relatively high levels of homicide 
rates in the past continued to have high rates in the study pe-
riod. Importantly, these controls maintain their significance 
in Models 2 and 3, which account for the infusion of loan 
dollars and the number of loans in neighborhoods.
While my evidence supports the hypothesis that bank loans 
affect homicide rates, might neighborhood homicide rates 
influence bank loans? Crime rates can affect the lending pro-
cess: for instance, recent research finds that crime, especially 
violent crime, affects neighborhood property values, foreclo-
sure rates, and housing prices (Immergluck and Smith 2006; 
Schwartz et al. 2003; Tita et al. 2006). It is likely that neigh-
borhoods with relatively higher homicide rates are allocated 
fewer loans than neighborhoods with less crime. If simul-
taneity occurs, the results in Table 3 would result in biased 
coefficients.6 To address this potential problem, I conducted 
a Hausman test for simultaneity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1991, 303-305). To do this, I followed Gregory Squires and 
Charis Kubrin (2006) and identified an instrument that is 
significantly correlated with lending dollars and the number 
of loans but that is uncorrelated with the residuals from the 
results of the regression from Table 3, Model 2 or 3. A vari-
5 The impact of concentrated disadvantage on local ho-
micide per capita rates is significant before racial com-
position variables are included (results not shown). But 
once measures of racial composition are included the 
effect of concentrated disadvantage is explained away.
6 The models as presented already partially take into 
account issues of reverse causality in two ways. First, 
note that Table 2 controls for the amount of homicide 
in neighborhoods in prior years (1989–1991). Doing so 
should capture the factors associated with homicide 
rates, including their effect on home mortgage lending 
and vice versa, in previous years. Model 3 shows that 
even after prior homicide was controlled, the coefficient 
for the loan rate remained statistically significant and 
substantially negative. Second, the model includes 
a spatial lag of the homicide per capita rate. This 
measure captures the dynamic between mortgage 
lending and crime that takes place in neighbor-
ing communities. The coefficient for the spatial lag 
of homicide is significant in Model 1 but loses its 
significance when lending variables are introduced.
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able that meets these criteria is the age of the housing stock 
in a census tract.7 Chicago tracts with older homes are better 
established and experience more lending activity, but the age 
of housing is not related to homicide levels. This variable is 
positively correlated with the lending dollars (.09) and loan 
numbers (.12) and uncorrelated with the regression residu-
als from Models 2 and 3 (.042 and .043, respectively). I then 
regressed the instrument and the exogenous independent 
variables on the two lending variables and saved the residu-
als for each loan model. Subsequently, I applied the resulting 
residuals from those models and included them as addition-
al independent variables in the estimation of neighborhood 
homicide rates. Table 4 shows these results; Model 1 refers to 
the number of loans variable and Model 2 refers to the loan 
dollars variable. As can be seen in both models in Table 4, 
the residual terms from stage one are not a statistically sig-
nificant predictor of homicide per capita rates (significance 
level equals 0.103 and .125 respectively) in stage two. Thus 
there is no statistical evidence that simultaneity is a problem 
in the results displayed in Table 3 (for examples of how bank 
activity directly affects lending, see also Immergluck and 
Smith 2006; Squires and Kubrin 2006). Bank lending, in 
other words, matters for the neighborhood distribution of 
homicide.
Table 4:  Negative binomial results predicting homicide 
per capita rates with robust standard errors from 
Hausman test for simultaneity (N=786)
Model 1
Loan numbers
b
(se)
Model 2
Loan dollars
b
(se)
Loan measure -.010**(.004)
-.068*
(.022)
Residual from stage 1 .007(.004)
.048
(.031)
African American neighborhood 1.013***(.254)
1.192***
(.204)
Latino neighborhood .895***(.168)
.946***
(.152)
Heterogeneous neighborhood 1.021**(.349)
1.080**
(.333)
Concentrated disadvantage .029(.020)
.026
(.020)
Median housing values .001(.001)
.000
(.001)
Residential stability .108(.056)
.021
(.037)
Prior homicide rate .144(.078)
.169*
(.077)
Number of housing units .001***(.000)
.001***
(.000)
Spatial lag of homicide .051***(.011)
.046***
(.011)
Constant -.415* -.589**
Wald chi square 709.36*** 687.31***
Note: * p < .05, two tailed; ** p < .01, two tailed; *** p < .001, two tailed
 
7 Utilizing 1990 Census data (STF 3A), I op-
erationalized the age of the housing stock 
with the average median year in which 
homes were built in a census tract.
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6. Conclusion
We have vast evidence from around the world that political 
and economic actors, including banks, affect at the neigh-
borhood level social capital, financial exclusion, residential 
racial or ethnic segregation, physical disorder, residential 
stability, park and recreation facilities, and community 
decline (Aalbers 2005; Bolt et al. 2008; Bursik 1989; Button 
1989; Giffinger 1998; Massey and Denton 1993; Orr 1999; 
Skogan 1990; Squires and O’Connor 2001). A major concern 
is that these actors facilitate socio-spatial segmentation that 
allocates resources to places already set up to prosper, while 
resources are diverted from or denied to places already vul-
nerable to deleterious conditions such as crime—magnifying 
the impact of inequality (Fuller and Mellor 2008).
This article has shown that banks allocate fewer loans and 
loan dollars—between 90 to 76 fewer loans and about $10 
million less—to the typical black or Latino neighborhood 
compared to its white counterpart. That about half of that 
disparity can be explained by class differences between 
white and minority neighborhoods is of less consequence to 
minority residents, who must nonetheless live in neighbor-
hoods that experience the full disparity in loan allocation. It 
is not surprising, of course, that bank loans are distributed 
unequally across race, nor that local decisions governing 
a highly lucrative resource are divided along racial lines 
(Farley, Danziger, and Holzer 2000; Dedman 1988; Ezeala-
Harrison et al. 2008; Munnell et al. 1992; Musterd, Priemus 
and Van Kempen 1999; Peterson and Krivo 2009; Santoro 
1995; Squires 1994; Squires and Kubrin 2006). Clearly, lend-
ing across Chicago neighborhoods is taking place in a racial-
ized context that favors white communities over minority 
communities.
My findings also suggest that the availability of bank loans 
reduces lethal violence in all neighborhoods as well as helps 
to reduce violence in minority communities. Shifting from 
an exclusive focus on intra-neighborhood dynamics to an 
approach that pays more attention to the actions of outside 
political and economic actors is especially important when 
examining the racial patterning of crime. Minority com-
munities, especially those that are economically disadvan-
taged, have long been adversely affected by the decisions of 
outside economic and political actors (Browning, Marshall, 
and Tabb 1984; Button 1989; Massey and Denton 1993; Stone 
1989). My findings underscore the claim that the unequal 
distribution of loans is important in making minority neigh-
borhoods more vulnerable to crime-producing conditions.
One implication concerns how criminologists conceptual-
ize neighborhood “structural” conditions like poverty rates, 
male joblessness, single-parent families, and residential 
segregation. The dominant approach is to take structural 
factors as given—leaving them largely unanalyzed and 
untheorized. Yet structural conditions are themselves the 
product of a long series of events. Whether it is histori-
cal or contemporary practices that deny housing to blacks 
in white neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993), place 
public housing projects in minority neighborhoods (Bur-
sik 1989, McNulty and Holloway 2000), limit minority job 
opportunities (Neckerman and Kirschenman 1991), or limit 
access to financial capital (Fuller and Mellor 2008; Logan 
and Molotch 1987; Smith et al. 2001; Squires and O’Connor 
2001), structural conditions can meaningfully be viewed in 
part as products of racial inequality. Any study seeking to 
understand the racial patterning of crime needs to ground 
the investigation in an examination of racial inequality in 
political and economic power (see Bonilla-Silva 1997).
Finding that access to capital affects local homicide rates 
also speaks to the importance of legislation such as the 
Community Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act. These acts are seen as critical for opening 
up mortgage lending to underserved communities and their 
residents as well as for facilitating the study of lending pat-
terns by scholars, community advocates, and policy mak-
ers. Yet since the late 1990s, various initiatives by the U.S. 
Congress and the Executive Branch have weakened these 
policies’ ability to pressure lenders for equitable lending 
(Ashton 2008; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Woodstock 2009). 
For instance, banks have the option of excluding the lend-
ing activities of various affiliates in their CRA performance 
evaluations, making it difficult to monitor higher-risk sub-
prime mortgages (Woodstock 2009). And when the current 
economic crisis is presented as partly a result of “bad loans 
to risky people,” advocates of community reinvestment 
are concerned that such policies will be further weakened 
(Woodstock 2009). For example, President Obama supports 
168IJCV : Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 154 – 171María B. Veléz: Banks and the Racial Patterning of Homicide
creation of a new regulatory structure that will provide safe-
ty nets for consumers and mechanisms to control banks, 
but as a recent New York Times editorial pointed out, the 
banking industry has funneled millions of dollars into lob-
bying efforts to make sure this new regulatory system does 
not have much enforcement power (New York Times 2009). 
Without strong regulation and a strengthening of commu-
nity reinvestment initiatives, there will be even less capital 
for poor and minority neighborhoods. These communi-
ties will continue to pay the cost of lending inequalities 
by suffering increased violence. And these neighborhoods 
will continue to be underprivileged places characterized by 
limited structures of opportunity and diminished quality of 
life for their residents.
Whether the findings of this study are unique to Chicago 
must be addressed in future research, especially because 
Chicago has an extensive history of activism concerning 
community reinvestment (see Squires and O’Conner 2001) 
and because the banking system in the United States is 
less regulated than in many other parts of the world. Three 
avenues of future study seem particularly promising. First, 
comparative analysis of city neighborhoods within and 
across countries would be most helpful. For instance, we 
have strong evidence that the high crime rates in minority 
neighborhoods are due to their disadvantaged conditions 
such as extreme levels of poverty and male joblessness. But 
this knowledge is almost exclusively based on research on 
neighborhoods within the United States, a country with 
well-entrenched systems of discrimination that make race 
and concentrated disadvantage almost inextricable. How 
do these factors operate in other racial contexts? Another 
question is how the political economy of a country affects 
the distribution of bank lending and the impact of lending 
on neighborhood crime. The Netherlands, for instance, has 
a highly regulated and monitored banking system that may 
produce fewer disparities in loans across social or racial 
groups. Second, research should investigate how neigh-
borhoods solicit bank resources and bid for inclusion in 
financial institutions (Fuller and Mellor 2008). Core issues 
include the benefits of neighborhood mobilization, and 
connections to the formal political system, and whether the 
benefits of being connected to a city’s political system are 
the same for white and minority neighborhoods. And fi-
nally, because subprime lending is concentrated in the very 
same poor and minority communities that experience gaps 
in mortgage lending, it will be important to disentangle the 
effects of predatory and conventional mortgage lending on 
crime. Understanding how bank lending shapes neighbor-
hood crime rates will facilitate a better understanding of the 
intersections of race, political economy, and crime-produc-
ing conditions.
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